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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No. 20020220-CA

v.
CHARLES LEE DIVINEY,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence entered on pleas of guilty to
burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1999);
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999);
two counts of simple assault, class A and B misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-102 (Supp. 2000); and one count of violation of a protective order, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1999) (R. 103-12; R. 291)
(statutes attached in Addendum A).
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
(2002), pursuant to the transfer of this matter from the Utah Supreme Court by order dated
May 14, 2002.]

'The May 14 letter notes that the transfer was made because the appeal was from
"an order, judgement or decree of a court in a case that is not within the original appellate

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Is reference in the written judgment to "aggravated" burglary a clerical
error which this Court may correct?
A clerical error may be considered by this Court for the first time on appeal. See
State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388, 1390 (Utah 1988) (noting that clerical errors have
frequently been corrected by this Court without notice to a defendant); State v. Larson,
758 P.2d 901, 904 (1988). To ascertain the clerical nature of the mistake, this Court will
look to the record to harmonize the intent of the court with the written judgment. See
Lorrah, 761 P.2d at 1389; State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 987-88 (Utah 1986).
2. Did the trial court commit plain error in determining the amount of
restitution owed by defendant for one victim's lost wages and personal property
loss?
Because defendant preserved only one of the three restitution arguments in his
brief, two standards of review apply.2 Defendant preserved his argument regarding the

jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court." However, the appeal was properly filed in that
Court because it involved a "charge of a first degree felony[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(i) (2002). Consequently, the appeal has not been transferred for a proper reason, and
this Court may wish to transfer the matter to the Utah Supreme Court for a determination
of whether they will address the appeal or pour it over to this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4).
2

Defendant claims to have preserved the entire second issue below, citing to (R.
408:12-13; R. 292-93; and R. 410). Br. of Aplt. at 3. However, the sole citation which
deals with the arguments raised on appeal is volume number 293, which defendant cites
in its entirety. Id. In it, defendant objects to Deborah's claim of restitution for lost wages
2

"charge-off' time for which he was ordered to pay restitution (R. 293:3). This Court has
recognized that "'the imposition of restitution is a matter left to the discretion of the [trial]
court.'" State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 179, % 10, 72 P.3d 692 (quoting State v. Robertson,
932 P.2d 1219, 1233 (Utah 1997), overruled on other grounds by State v. Weeks, 2002
UT 98, f 24, 61 P.3d 1000); see also State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, % 6,
Adv. Rep.

Utah

. We Mwill not disturb a trial court's restitution order 'unless it exceeds that

prescribed by law or [the court] otherwise abused its discretion.' " State v. Bickley, 2002

on "charge-off days based on the same argument he makes in his appellate brief (R.
293:3). Br. of Aplt. at 18-23. He also references the installation of the burglar alarm at
Deborah's principal address, but he presents to supporting argument (R. 293:3). Hence,
any objection relating to that alarm was not properly preserved for appeal. See State v.
Pugmire, 898 P.2d 271, 272-73 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 360
(Utah App. 1993) (appellate review of criminal cases in Utah requires 'that a
contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of claims of error must
be made a part of the trial court record'") (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551
(Utah 1987).
The remaining record cites do not contain any specific objection to the restitution
amounts. Transcript number 408 is the sentencing transcript, and pages 12 through 13
include only defense counsel's general objection "to the amount of restitution^]" made
solely "for purposes of preserving our right to a [restitution] hearing" (R. 408:13).
Transcript number 410 is the transcript from the first part of the restitution hearing
at which the parties discovered that the reparation officer did not have all the necessary
documentation with her and that defense counsel had not received all the documentation
that the prosecutor had sent to him (R. 410:9-13). Consequently, the hearing was
rescheduled without defendant having objected to any particular restitution amount.
Transcript number 292 reflects the main body of the restitution hearing and the
questioning of the witnesses. When the defense rested, the trial court immediately
requested written briefs (R. 292:72-73). Defendant voiced no objections to any of the
evidence at that point (R. 292:73-76).
3

UT App 342, K 15, 60 P-3d 582 (quoting State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, If 7, 12 P.3d
110) (additional quotations omitted); see also Corbitt, 2003 UT App. 417, t 6 ("'[T[he
exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court
and the appellate court can properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable
[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.'") (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584
P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)).
Defendant did not preserve his challenges to the amounts ordered for lost wages
generally or for personal property. Accordingly, these arguments should be reviewed
under the plain error doctrine. To establish plain error, a defendant must show: "(0 [ a l n
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful[.]" See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993); see also State v.
Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79, % 18, 373 P.3d 187.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999) is relevant to the issues presented on appeal
and is contained in its entirety in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Despite the existence of a permanent protective order issued on May 5, 2002,
defendant could not leave his ex-wife Deborah alone (R. 289, letter dated 1/21/01; R.
292:10, 32-34).3 On July 5, 2000, defendant was charged with witness tampering, a third

3

Deborah is also referred to as "Debra" at various parts of the record. The State
uses "Deborah" as it appears in the transcripts.
4

degree felony, two counts of assault, class A and B misdemeanors, and one count of
violating a protective order, a class A misdemeanor (Case No. 001911430: 2-4). The
offenses occurred June 14, 2000, and the victim was Deborah (id.). On July 13, 2000,
defendant was charged in a separate case with aggravated burglary, a first degree felony,
tampering with a witness, a third degree felony, aggravated assault, a third degree felony,
and violation of a protective order, a class A misdemeanor (Case No. 001912025: 2-7).4
These offenses occurred on July 11, and the victims were Deborah, and one of
defendant's sons, Charles Lee Diviney III ["Chuck"] (id.).
Defendant and the prosecutor reached a plea agreement in which defendant entered
an Alford plea5 of guilty to one count of burglary, a second degree felony, one count of
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, two counts of simple assault, class A and B
misdemeanors, and violation of a protective order, a class A misdemeanor (R. 103-15; R.
291). The charges were amended into a single information in this case, and the other case
was dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement (R. 113-15; R. 291: 3-5). The prosecutor
also agreed to "recommend no prison time[,]" to recommend "that all sentences in this
matter run concurrent," and, "upon successful completion of probation, [to] recommend
reduction of the charges pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3- 402 (1999) (R. 291:12).

4

The charges were consolidated as part of a plea bargain, and the first case was
dismissed (R. 103-15; R. 291; 12). Hence, the remaining record cites herein are to the
pleadingsin case number 001912025.
Pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970).
5

The trial court accepted defendant's pleas and ordered preparation of a presentence
investigation report (R. 119-21; R. 291: 12-14). Thereafter, the trial judge sentenced
defendant to serve one-to-fifteen years in the state prison for each of the felony counts,
and twenty-four months in jail for each of the misdemeanor counts, all sentences to run
concurrently (R. 122-28; R. 408:8-13) (the Judgment is attached in Addendum B). The
court then suspended the prison sentences and sentenced defendant to jail for twenty-four
months, with the possibility of early release if he obtained treatment while in jail and if he
was released to a treatment program (id.). The court also ordered that defendant pay
restitution, but left the amount to be determined at a later date by AP&P (id.).
Defense counsel moved to correct his sentence on the ground that, by statute, he
could be incarcerated in the county jail for no more than one year, most of which he had
served by that time (R. 132-34, 138-39). He also requested a restitution hearing to
challenge the amount set by AP&P as restitution (R. 153-54).
The evidentiary hearing occurred on December 17, 2001, followed by the
prosecutor's submission of a written brief and oral argument (R. 182-83, 184-87). A
reparation officer from Crime Victims Reparations ["CVR"], Christine Ackmann,
testified at the hearing, together with Deborah and her son, Chuck (R. 292:2). Ms.
Ackmann testified that CVR paid the victims a total of $ 4,661,34, and explained how
they verified the claims and the type of things for which they had paid (R. 410: 5-7, R.
292:7-18). Deborah testified concerning her injuries, the resulting loss of wages, and the
impact of the offenses on her and her living conditions (R. 292: 26-41, 47-55, 58-68).
6

After the hearing, the parties were given the opportunity to submit written
memoranda regarding the restitution amount to be ordered (R. 292: 72-73). The
prosecutor submitted a memorandum outlining several different amounts believed to be
owing (R. 184-87) (attached in Addendum C). Nothing appears in the record from
defendant. Following oral argument, the trial court ordered defendant to pay to CVR a
total of $ 4,098.42 with interest as presented in the State's memorandum, based on the
following amounts:
-$554.00 "for medical expenses such as co-payments and prescriptions that were
not covered" by Deborah's health insurer;
-$2,121.37 "for payments made [by CVR] " to Deborah for lost wages;
-$8.00 "for payments made to [Deborah] for travel expenses,"
-$916.00 f for payments made to [Deborah] for the expense of installing an alarm
system and the expense of quarterly fees associated with two alarm systems, and"
-$499.05 "for payments made to Chuck . . . for lost wages."
(R. 191-92) (emphasis added) (the order is attached in Addendum D).6 Defendant timely
appealed (R. 194-95).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The specific facts of the charged crimes have little bearing on the issues raised by
defendant in this appeal. The change of plea hearing transcript reflects that defendant
pled guilty to five counts, identifying the following factual bases for each:

6

The two emphasized amounts are the amounts challenged by defendant on appeal.
7

1. Burglary, a second degree felony:
-on July 11, 2000, defendant entered or remained unlawfully at his son
Chuck's home with the intent to commit an assault (R. 291:10);
2. Aggravated assault, a third degree felony:
-on July 11, 2000, defendant assaulted his son "by the use of a dangerous
weapon," i.e., "a tire changing implement" (R. 291:11-12);
3. Simple assault, a class A misdemeanor:
-on June 14, 2000, at Chuck's home, defendant "acted with unlawful force
or violence to cause substantial bodily injury" to his ex-wife, Deborah (R.
291:8-9);
4. Violation of a protective order, a class A misdemeanor:
-on June 14, 2000, at Chuck's home, defendant intentionally and
knowingly violated a protective order after having been properly served
with it (R. 291:9);
5. Simple assault, a class B misdemeanor:
-on June 14, 2000, at Chuck's home, defendant "used unlawful force or
violence that caused or created a substantial risk of violence" to Deborah
(R. 291:11).
In the June 14 incident, defendant attacked Deborah while she sat in her car at her
son Chuck's home, where she was living at the time (R. 292: 34, 35, 40, 56). He
repeatedly beat her, attempted to drag her from the car, and attempted to enter the car (R.
292:26, 40). During the incident, defendant inflicted upon Deborah "massive bruising"
on her face and right arm, a laceration across her eyebrow that required stitches, and
damage to her right thumb and her right wrist, both of which required separate surgeries
over the following months (R. 292:26-30; St's Exhs. 1-5). An additional surgery was
anticipated to remove a five-inch metal plate that was inserted in the wrist to stabilize it
because of the injury inflicted by defendant (R. 292: 30-31).

8

At all times relevant to the charged incidents, Deborah worked at two jobs (R. 292:
38). She worked part time at the Granite School District ["Granite"] and, hence, did not
receive benefits (R. 292: 38-39; R. 289, letter dated 1/20/01). She also worked full time
at Discover Financial Services ["Discover"] as a senior account manager (R. 292: 36, 3839). The latter job included paid benefits, enabling her to take paid leave for days related
to the charged incidents in this case (R. 292: 36). Consequently, all restitution amounts
relating to lost wages were wages lost in connection with the Granite job, not the
Discover job (R. 292:48).
Additional information relevant to the issues raised on appeal are included in the
arguments.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in entering into the record a
Judgment, Sentence and Commitment that identified the burglary charge to which
defendant pled guilty as an "aggravated" burglary. The State agrees that inclusion of the
term "aggravated" in the written Judgment was a clerical error which this Court should
address and correct on appeal. The State notes, however, that the trial court imposed the
correct statutory sentence for a burglary: one-to-fifteen years. Thus, the only correction is
to delete the word "aggravated."
Defendant advances three arguments which challenge the restitution amount set
below, only one of which has been properly preserved. First, he argues that the trial
judge overestimated the amount of lost wages Deborah incurred as a result of the injuries
9

she received, ordering defendant to pay more than was established by the evidence below.
The State agrees that the evidence supports defendant's calculation of general damages.
Therefore, a small adjustment in the amount ordered by the trial court should be made.
Second, defendant argues that the adjusted amount for lost wages should be further
adjusted for thirteen days for which Deborah received payment from CVR because of a
claimed inability to work both of her jobs due to her injuries. He claims that twelve of
the days were days she would not have worked both jobs, and, hence, she was not entitled
to payment. One of those days, together with a thirteenth day, were days when one job
was unavailable, leaving her unable to work it regardless of her injuries. This latter
challenge was not preserved for appellate review and should not be addressed by this
Court. Regardless, defendant fails to establish any plain error or abuse of discretion
where the evidence supports the award of wages for all of the challenged days.
Finally, defendant contends that the trial judge erred in calculating the amount of
property damage Deborah suffered because of his actions. He argues that he should not
have to reimburse her for the service payments for an alarm system located at her primary
residence which were made following the June 14 incident because that offense occurred
at Chuck's house. For the same reason, he claims that he should not be responsible for
the deadbolt locks Deborah installed in her home. However, defendant's failure to raise
these arguments below and his failure to argue plain error on appeal permits this Court to
reject his claims outright. Moreover, Deborah was living both at her primary residence
and with her son at the time of the incidents because of the insecurity she felt living alone
10

in her own home after defendant's multiple violations of the permanent protective order.
Because defendant's inability to leave her alone was clear from the presentence report,
the trial judge reasonably included in the restitution figure the amounts paid by Deborah
after the first incident to secure herself from defendant when in her own home.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE STATE AGREES THAT INCLUSION OF THE WORD
"AGGRAVATED" IN THE WRITTEN JUDGMENT WAS A
CLERICAL ERROR AND SHOULD BE CORRECTED
Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain or clerical error in entering
into the record a Judgment, Sentence and Commitment that reflected that defendant
entered a guilty plea to "aggravated" burglary instead of burglary. Br. of Aplt. at 8-15.
See Add. B. The State agrees that this was a clerical error which this Court may correct
on appeal. See State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388, 1389 (Utah 1988); see also State v.
Larson, 758 P.2d 901, 904 (Utah 1988). "A clerical error, as contradistinguished from
judicial error, is not 'the deliberate result of the exercise of judicial reasoning and
determination."' Lorrah, 761 P.2d at 1389 (quoting State v. Mossman, 75 Or.App. 385,
706 P.2d 203, 204 (1985) (additional quotation omitted)). To determine whether the
mistake is a clerical one, this Court looks to the record "to harmonize the intent of the
[trial] court with the written judgment." Lorrah, 761 P.2d at 1389; State v. Shelby, 728
P.2d 987, 987-88 (Utah 1986).

11

It is clear from the transcript of the change of plea hearing not only that the parties
agreed that defendant would plead guilty to second degree burglary, but that defendant
did, in fact, intend to enter such a plea and the trial court understood as much (R. 113-15;
R. 291:3-4, 10). The State therefore agrees to correction of the record by removing the
word "aggravated" as used in the final written judgment (R. 122-28). The State notes,
however, that the trial court imposed the correct statutory sentence for a second degree
burglary: one-to-fifteen years (R. 122-28).
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS DEFENDANT'S CALCULATION OF
GENERAL DAMAGES FOR FORTY-ONE DAYS OF LOST
WAGES, REQUIRING ADJUSTMENT OF THE AMOUNT
ORDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT; HOWEVER, HE IDENTIFIES
NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REIMBURSEMENT FOR
"CHARGE-OFF" DAYS, AND HIS CHALLENGE TO THE
PERSONAL PROPERTY AWARD IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE
THIS COURT
Defendant raises several claims of error relating to the restitution award below. He
claims that the restitution award should be reduced by a total of $ 770.37 to reflect a
calculation error in lost wages demonstrated by the record evidence. Br. of Aplt. at 1523. The error, he claims, derives from the trial court's overestimation of the amount of
lost wages generally, and the court's inclusion of payment for twelve "charge-off days
and one additional day allegedly missed from work at Granite when none of the thirteen
days were reimbursable. Id. He argues that the evidence supports reduction of the full
amount awarded for all thirteen days because Deborah's conduct established that she

12

would not have worked both jobs on those days absent the injuries, and the school district
was closed during one month, rendering payment of lost wages on all thirteen days
improper. {Id. at 18-23).
Defendant completes his argument by complaining that the restitution amount
ordered for the victim's personal property losses improperly includes payment for
deadbolt locks and maintenance service on an alarm system at Deborah's primary
residence on Hazelhurst. Id. at 23-27. He claims that because he neither pled guilty to
nor was charged with committing any offense at that address, he cannot be liable for
payment of any security measures the victim may have taken at that address. Id.
Only part of defendant's first claim has merit. The evidence fully supports
defendant's calculation of restitution for the forty-one days of lost wages, requiring a
slight adjustment to the restitution order. However, defendant fails to establish an abuse
of discretion in ordering restitution for the twelve "charge-off days where the evidence
amply supports the trial court's decision. Further, defendant did not preserve for appeal
his challenge to the property damage award, nor did he include a plain error argument in
his opening brief, permitting this Court to refuse to reach his argument. See State v.
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) ("[T]he preservation rule applies to every
claim . . . unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or
'plain error' occurred. . . . If a defendant fails to argue exceptional circumstances or plain
error justifies review on appeal, then 'we [will] decline to consider [the issue] on appeal."
(citations omitted)). Even on the merits, the personal property award is fully justified by
13

the relationship between defendant, Deborah's primary residence, and the charged
offenses.
A.

The Trial Court's Calculation of Lost Wages Generally Requires a Minor
Adjustment
The trial court determined that the prosecutor's restitution calculations contained

in his written brief were representative of the evidence and issued an order detailing the
various restitution amounts for which defendant was responsible (R. 191-93; R. 293:6-7).
Add. D. However, a review of the prosecutor's calculations below and defendant's
calculations on appeal reveals that defendant's calculations are more representative of the
evidence adduced below. The prosecutor's calculations begin with what Deborah
received from CVR and subtracts what the evidence showed she was not entitled to
receive (R. 184-87). Defendant's calculations identify the amount of lost wages Deborah
was owed for the days the evidence suggests she actually missed work, regardless of what
she may have received from CVR. Br. of Aplt. at 17-18.
Christine Ackmann, the reparation officer in charge of Deborah's claims, testified
that CVR paid a total of $2,362.41 in lost wages to Deborah because of the two incidents
charged in this case (R. 410: 3-4, 6). Ackmann established that Deborah worked an
average of 5.8 hours per day at the school district, earned $12.48 per hour, and was paid
by CVR for 66.66% of the amount she earned in order to account for taxes that would
otherwise have been paid from her wages (R. 292: 24-25).
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The prosecutor began his calculations for lost wages with the total amount paid by
CVR, presuming its accuracy (R. 185-86). It is this presumption that accounts for the
difference in how the prosecutor and the defendant calculate the amount to be paid. The
prosecutor subtracted from the total paid to CVR the wages for "5 days that were not
related to either of the two incidents . . . ." (R. 185-86). Those five days occurred
between May 5 and May 30, prior to the first incident in this matter on June 14, 2000 (R.
292:24). Multiplying the hours worked per day by the amount earned per hour, and
rounding to two decimal places, provides a daily rate of pay amounting to S72.38.7
Multiplying that daily rate by the five days that should not have been paid produces a
figure of S361.90.8 CVR paid Deborah 66.66% of that amount for those five days (R.
292: 24). The prosecutor calculated the amount paid to be $241.04 and subtracted that
amount from the total paid by CVR to obtain the amount he claimed defendant should pay
as restitution for general lost wages (R. 186).9 Accordingly, the prosecutor determined,
and the trial court agreed, that the total amount paid for lost wages minus the five days
that were unrelated to these incidents amounted to $2,121.37 (R. 186, 192).10

7

5.8 hours per day x $12.48 per hour = $72.38 per day.

8

$72.38 per day x 5 days = $361.90 earned.

9

Carrying all calculations out two decimal places, the figure is more properly
calculated at $ 241.24: $361.90 x 66.66% = $241.24. However, this slight difference is
irrelevant here as defendant's calculations, not the prosecutor's, are more accurate as to
lost wages in this case.
10

$2,362.41 paid by CVR - $ 241.04 for five days' overpayment = $2,121.37.
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Defendant challenges that calculation, presenting what is a more appropriate
calculation for lost wages. Br. of Aplt. at 17-18. He gathers the evidence relating to lost
wages, determines the amount owed for each day of work missed, then multiplies that by
the number of days the evidence established she actually missed, to arrive at a total figure
that was owed to her for lost wages. Id. There is no dispute as to the daily rate paid by
CVR: $48.25 per day, based on an average work day of 5.8 hours, a pay rate of $12.48
per hour, and payment by CVR of 66.66 % of the total in lost wages (R. 186; R.
292:24).n Br. of Aplt. at 18. There is also no dispute that the evidence showed Deborah
missed forty-one days of work generally, including dates relating to surgery, recovery,
pain, medical visits, and prosecution of the charges (R. 292:10-13) (for the reader's
convenience, a chart of these dates is attached in Addendum E). Br. of Aplt. at 17-18.12
Multiplying the daily rate of $48.25 by the forty-one missed days establishes that CVR
should have paid the victim a total of $ 1,978.25 for these days.13 This is the amount
arrived at by defendant. Id. at 18.
The difference between the parties' calculations is that the prosecutor and trial
court took what CVR said it had paid Deborah, presumed that the amount was justified,
then subtracted the amounts paid for days of missed work that were not attributable to the
M

$12.48 per hour x 5.8 hrs per day x .6666 (rate paid by CVR) = $48.25. The
prosecutor included these amounts at various points in his calculations below (R. 184-87).
12

Defendant goes on to challenge the propriety of including thirteen of those days.
Br. of Aplt. at 18-23. See Point IIB for the State's response to defendant's challenge.
13

41 days x $48.25 per day = $1,978.25 owed by defendant.
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charged incidents. Defendant, on the other hand, used the amounts and missed days as
described by the witnesses below to calculate the amount owed based on the evidence
presented. Defendant's calculations in this part of his brief are fully supported by the
record evidence. The State agrees with defendant's determination that the restitution
order for lost wages should have initially been calculated to be $1,978.25.
In sum, the proper calculation for lost wages is as follows:
$12.48 per hour x 5.8 hours per day x 66.66% = $48.25 per day of lost wages
$48.25 x 41 lost days = $1,978.25 lost wages
Hence, the restitution figured ordered by the trial court—$2,121.37—should be adjusted
to $1,978.25.
B.

All "Charge-off" Days Were Properly Included in the Trial Court's
Restitution Calculation
The one argument preserved by defendant relating to restitution involves "charge-

off days. However, defendant's claim that Deborah was entitled to no recovery for
twelve "charge-off' days does not accurately represent the evidence adduced below. Br.
ofAplt. at 18-23.14

14

Defendant identifies twelve "charge-off days for which CVR compensated
Deborah. Br. of Aplt. at 20-21. However, neither Oct. 27, 2000, nor Jan. 30, 2001,
qualify as the last working day of those months (R. 292:59). See Add. E.
Defendant also identifies one of those days—July 31, 2000—and an additional
date when Deborah received compensation—July 18, 2001—as dates not warranting
compensation because Deborah testified that Granite was a year-round school that closed
during the month of July (R. 292:54-55). Id. at 18 & n.3, 21. However, there is no record
evidence concerning how Granite employees were paid: whether they were paid only
during the times they worked, or whether their salaries were adjusted to permit for
17

Deborah testified that the last working day of the month at Discover required
intensive work by the account managers to collect outstanding accounts (R. 292:58-59).
By 2:30 p.m. on those days, any accounts on which the account managers were not able
to collect were forwarded to the legal department for further action (R. 292:59). The
uncollectible accounts were, essentially, "charged-off' the account managers' books and
were no longer the responsibility of those workers. Because the work had to be done by
2:30, Deborah had routinely taken the day off from Granite School District so that she
could make the necessary efforts to complete her job at Discover before 2:30 (R. 292:
64). These days are what the parties describe as "charge-off days.
At the restitution hearing on December 17, 2001, Deborah testified that the policy
changed within "the last year-and-a-half, possibly closer to two years[.]" (R. 292:63).
Instead of having to transfer the uncollectible accounts to the legal department at 2:30
p.m., account managers were given until 7:45 p.m. to attempt to collect on their accounts
(R. 292:64-65). Because of the extended time, Deborah could work her part-time shift at
Granite School District, then go to Discover to work until time to transfer her
uncollectible accounts at 7:45 p.m., if she choose to do so (R. 292: 65).
Defendant argues that Deborah had ample opportunity before the first incident and
after her recovery to work at both jobs during "charge-off days but never did. Br. of

paychecks to be issued during the entire year, regardless of when the school was closed.
Because defendant did not preserve this issue below and did not argue plain error on
appeal, this Court should assume the regularity of the trial court's inclusion of these days
in the restitution calculation. See Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5.
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Aplt. at 19-20, 22-23. He also contends that since her recovery ushe has never worked
both jobs on 'charge-off days[.]" Id. at 20. Consequently, he contends, 'The history of
Deborah's routine and common practice supports that she never would have worked at
the school district on those ["charge-off] days." Id. at 21. Defendant claims that absent
evidence that she would have actually worked both jobs subsequent to his infliction of her
injuries, she cannot establish entitlement to any lost wages for those "charge-off' days,
and he need not pay restitution for them. Id.
The absence of any prior history of working both jobs is of little relevance here
because the evidence shows that Deborah had little, if any, opportunity to establish such a
"history" prior to being injured. The timing of the policy change which permitted her the
opportunity to work both jobs is crucial. Deborah's testimony puts the policy change at
or shortly before June 2000 (R. 292:63). The first incident in this case occurred June 14,
2000 (R. 291: 8-9). "Charge-off days occurred on the last working day of each month
(R. 292: 59). Consequently, defendant's argument that Deborah did not establish that she
ever worked both jobs on "charge-off days prior to her first injuries does not
demonstrate that she would not have worked the days in question here. More precisely,
the evidence reasonably suggests that Deborah did not have an opportunity to work both
jobs because the injuries occurred shortly after the policy change that would have allowed
her to do so. Hence, the absence of any evidence that she worked both jobs on "chargeoff day prior to her injuries does not support defendant's argument that she was not
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entitled to be paid during her recovery period for those days on which she could have
worked both jobs.
Further, Deborah testified that following infliction of the injuries, she tried to work
both jobs, but could not "Due to the limitations of [her] wrist[,]" which was injured in the
first incident (R. 292: 60-61, 65). She explained that, after telling her doctor what her
jobs entailed, he admonished her "to avoid activity that would cause pain and swelling"
(R. 292: 66). When asked if she could do both jobs in one day, she responded:
No. No. I-I tried that. On days that I worked at the District and
then worked at Discover Card in which I typed for any length of time, it
would cause swelling of my wrist, so I knew that on charge-off day, where I
absolutely had to do nothing but typing, I couldn't take breaks and do
other—other work on these accounts, so I knew I had to do one or the other.
So, I did do the charge-off day at Discover Card.
(R. 292: 60-61). Hence, the evidence supports the trial court's implicit determination that
the victim was unable to work both jobs on "charge-off days because of defendant's
conduct, and that defendant therefore owed restitution for the lost wages paid to her as a
result of those "charge-off days she was not able to work both jobs (R. 184-87, 191-93).
Because defendant has failed to establish any abuse of discretion in the trial court's
determination that he owed restitution for these "charge-off days, defendant's challenge
necessarily fails.
Moreover, defendant claims that Deborah was required to mitigate the damages
flowing from her injuries. Br. of Aplt. at 16, 22. Because she could have, but did not,
work at the school district on "charge-off days and take annual or sick leave from
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Discover so the CVR would not have to pay restitution for these days, defendant claims
Deborah did not adequately mitigate her losses and, hence, he need not pay restitution for
the "charge-off days. Id.
Deborah testified that her "charge-off day at Discover "requires constant phone
calling and memoing on the accounts, which is very—was very stressful to [her] wrist. . .
On charge-off day, I talk and I type." (R. 292: 59-60). As stressful as that may have been
to her wrist, she also testified that at the school district, she was the lunch manager for an
elementary school:
. . . . I go in and I cook the food in very large ovens, with pans. 1
serve the food, I prepare a lot of the food and I clean up at the end of the
day. This, again, requires heavy use of my wrist, continuous use of my
right [wrist], 'cause I am right-handed.
(R. 292: 60). Nothing in the record establishes that a day of working at the school district
was less taxing on her wrist than a day of calling and typing at Discover. Accordingly,
there is no basis in the record evidence for defendant's claim that Deborah "chose to work
the more stressful job" and was not entitled to reimbursement for lost wages from the
school district because it was unreasonable of her not to forego her work at Discover for
the school district job. Br. of Aplt. at 16, 22. To the contrary, Deborah met the
mitigation requirement by getting out and working despite her injuries, and defendant has
not established that the trial court's failure to require that she choose to work the job
which saved the State the most money was plain error.
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C.

The Personal Property Claim is not Properly Before this Court; Regardless, it
is Without Merit
Defendant claims that the $ 916.00 amount ordered by the trial court as restitution

for personal property loss to the victims is erroneously high. Br. of Aplt. at 23-27. He
argues that he should not be required to pay for the servicing of the alarm system put into
Deborah's primary residence on West Hazelhurst because the alarm was not installed as a
result of the offenses to which he entered guilty pleas, and neither of those offenses
occurred at that residence. Id. at 25-27. He claims that anything related to the alarm
system at that address is irrelevant to these proceedings and cannot be included in the
restitution calculation. Id. Because defendant did not raise this argument below when he
mentioned "installation of the burglar alarm" prior to the first offense (R. 293: 3), and he
made no other specific objection to payment of the post-June 14 service fee for the alarm
system, his claim is not properly before this Court, and, absent any claim of plain error in
his opening brief, this Court should refuse to reach it {see footnote 2, supra). See
Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5.
Even under the plain error doctrine, defendant's claim is without merit. Under
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(c)(i) (1999), the trial court can order payment of complete
restitution, meaning "the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused
by the defendantf.]" See, e.g., State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ^ 12,
Rep.

Utah Adv.

. Under subsection (8), the court may order restitution for the offense, including
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"any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court. . .." Utah
Code Ann. §76-3-201(8).
As a result of several incidences occurring after issuance of a protective order on
May 4, 2001, Deborah had an alarm system installed in her primary residence on West
Hazelhurst (R. 292: 32). That is the home owned jointly by Deborah and defendant (R.
289, letter dated 1/22/01). The cost of the system, its installation, and its first service
payment were incurred prior to the June 14 incident in this case and were reimbursed by
CVR (R. 292: 15-18). After the June 14 incident, Deborah had deadbolts installed, either
in her primary home or in her son's home, where she was living part of the time when she
was attacked by defendant (R. 292: 14-20).I5 Following the July 11 incident, she
purchased an alarm system for her son's home, together with a service agreement (R. 292:
33-34). All the costs incurred with respect to the son's home were directly related to the
charged incidents (id.).

'•Defendant contends that the deadbolts were installed at Deborah's primary
residence on Hazelburst. Br. of Aplt. at 24. Accordingly, he includes them in his
argument that he is not responsible for security measures taken at that residence because
it is unrelated to where he committed the crimes to which he pled guilty. Id. at 24-25, 27.
However, the evidence is unclear as to whether the deadbolts were installed at her
orimary residence or at her son's residence, where she was living periodically at the time
Df the attacks (R. 292:14-20, 33-34). If they were installed at Deborah's primary
•esidence, they are subject to the same argument as the alarm system service payments,
md defendant's plain error claim that they should not have been included in the
•estitution amount ordered by the trial court would fail. See text, infra. If they were
nstalled at defendant's son's home, where both crimes took place, his plain error claim as
o them also fails.
23

The trial court ordered defendant to pay $ 916 in restitution "for payments made to
Debra [sic] Diviney for the expense of installing an alarm system and the expense of
quarterly fees associated with two alarm systems[.]" (R. 192). Add. D. This amount was
derived from the prosecutor's restitution brief In that brief, the prosecutor makes it clear
that he did not include within that amount the cost of buying and installing the first alarm
system in Deborah's primary residence on Hazelhurst ($494.00) or the cost of the first
service payment ($ 82) (R. 184-87). Add. C. Deborah testified that the system was
installed as the result of prior conduct by defendant (R. 292:31-32). Consequently, the
prosecutor and the trial court omitted from the final restitution calculation the purchase
and installation of the system prior to the June 14 incident as well as the first maintenance
payment (R. 184-87, 192). Add. C and D, respectively.
However, Deborah also testified that the continuance of the alarm system after
June 14 was related to the June 14 incident (R. 292: 33). At the time of that incident,
Deborah was living at the Hazelhurst address where the first alarm had been installed (R.
292: 33). After a series of events occurred involving defendant and the Hazelhurst
address, Deborah began to live both in her own home and in her son's home on Royal
Harvest Way (R. 292: 34). She preferred to stay at her own home but did not feel that she
could fully secure it and, hence, felt uncomfortable staying there alone (R. 292: 34-35).
Because Deborah lived at that residence periodically and maintained an ownership
interest in it, and because of her undeniable need for protection from defendant given his
ability to find her and attack her at the home of one of her sons and given his history of
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protective order violations toward Deborah, it was not plain error for the trial court to
include in the restitution order payment for the continued service of the alarm system at
that address (R. 289, letter dated 1/22/01; R. 292: 10, 32-34).16 The reasonableness of
that determination was later made clear by evidence suggesting that defendant later
frequented the area in which Deborah lived and may have been responsible for damage to
the home and a car parked outside the home (R. 203-05, 227-28; R. 411). Hence,
defendant's claim of plain error fails.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court correct the
clerical error in the Judgment's reference to the charge of "aggravated" burglary. The
State also requests that this Court reduce the restitution amount as to lost wages from
$2,121.37 to $1,978.25. Finally, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm
defendant's convictions, sentences, and restitution responsibility in all other respects.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5 ^ _ day of December, 2003.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Assistant Attorney General

16

Service for each of the alarm systems amounted to $ 90.00 for each quarter
hrough the first year (R. 292: 22).
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76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combination of sentences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution
— Hearing.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings
and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in
Subsection (4He).
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendants criminal
activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's
criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(g) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law
to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty,
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
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(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, the court shaii order that the defendant make restitution to
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as
defined in Subsection (l)(e).
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections
(4)(c) and (4)(d).
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in
Subsection (8Kb) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of
the order to the parties.
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover
reasonable attorney's fees.
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77,
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended
by any governmental entity for the extradition.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4)(c).
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete
restitution and court-ordered restitution.
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant.
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing.
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be
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(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for
the decision a part of the court record.
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment,
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim.
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63,
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the
defendant a full hearing on the issue.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal
charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported;
and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported,
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants
actually transported in a single trip.
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to
the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in
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the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports
received under Section 76*-.'M0'l, statements in aggravation or mitigation
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing
(d) T h e court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) In d e t e r m i n i n g a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing Commission.
f 7) I f d u r i n g the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child,
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and i f the charge is
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or
found t r u e by a judge or j u r y at t r i a l , the defendant shall be sentenced to the
highest minimum t e r m in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over
any conflicting provision of law.
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for a n offense, the offense
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A
victim of a n offense, t h a t involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or
a p a t t e r n of c r i m i n a l activity, includes any person directly harmed by the
d e f e n d a n t s criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or
pattern.
(b) I n d e t e r m i n i n g the monetary sum and other conditions for complete
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
fii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care,
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance w i t h
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment;
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilit a t i o n ; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services i f the offense
resulted in the death of a victim
(c) I n d e t e r m i n i n g the monetary sum and other conditions for courtordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (8Kb) a n d .
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden t h a t
p a y m e n t of restitution will impose, w i t h regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
(d) T h e court may decline to make an order or may defer entering a n
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order
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of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to
provide restitution to the victim.
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ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES
76-5-102. Assault.
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(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, t h a t causes or
creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person h a s knowledge of t h e
pregnancy
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily
injury to another.

76-5-103. Aggravated assault.

UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED

(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in
Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection
(lXa), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (1Kb) is a third degree felony.

1953
76-5-108. Protective orders restraining abuse of another
— Violation.

VOLUME 8B
1999 REPLACEMENT

(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject to a protective
order or ex parte protective order issued under Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant
Abuse Act, or Title 78, Chapter 3a, Juvenile Court Act of 1996, Title 77,
Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act, or a foreign protective order as
described in Section 30-6-12, who intentionally or knowingly violates that
order after having been properly served, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor,
except as a greater penalty may be provided in Title 77, Chapter 36,
Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act.
(2) Violation of an order as described in Subsection < 1) is a domestic violence
offense under Section 77-36-1 and subject to increased penalties in accordance
with Section 77-36-1.1.

Titles 76 and 77
76-6-202. Burglary.
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or
commit an assault on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
E STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT) TO
SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL

Plaintiff,

0c

Case No.
Count No
Honorable
Nrc
Clerk
\N\ft
Reporter
Bailiff _
Date _

CA^'i^J^t^ i > ( V , njL^y

Defendant.

ii/j^r
_i
CH.^L

(T&gLq-g*. ^--^o-oi

. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
he motion of.
>ose sentence accordingly is • granted • denied. There being no. legal or other reason why sentence
)lea of guilty; D plea
and represented by
bxuut
(J\\\ASA
^ a n d the State being represented by "pCXYNg
fv adjudged guilty of the above offense,
:fs now sentenced to a term in the Salt Lake County Jail,
months;
'oi_2
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
^and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $.

U^Cy-n

is

5

,such sentence is to run concurrently with
g \N c
such sentence is to run consecutively with
upon motion of • State,D Defense, D Court, Count(s)

.ts

ttf^e \o

VXWPA\^

Q\XYS
are hereby dismissed.

Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D jail) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of this
Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Probation and
'Pfcirole for the period of
pursuant to the attached conditions of probation, ... _
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, to be confined and
imprisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
Commitment shall issue
A
•' .
• -••-/•
DATED this
3

day of

if
i8to£sii*ac!0\

R0VED AS TO FORM:

ftCA^Defense Counsel
T>. V\o\Cvn
Deputy County Attorney

CTION OF JUDGE
Page
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-

A J ^

Judgment/Sentence_

. /Honorable

AW'-Cc...

ct'i

7tS>>~

CONDITIONS OF PROBATION

</ /

"1$^ Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Dept. of Adult Probation
on&& IParole
a Serve
c^
t
^
in the Salt Lake County Jail commencing.
• Pay a fine in the amount of $
D at a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole; n at a rate of
.
s
i ^ P a y restitution in the amount of $
; or&Jn an amount to be determined by the Department of Adult
Probation and Parole; D at a rate of.
or D at a rate to be determined by
, the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
i s * Enter, participate in, and complete any
program, counseling, or treatment as
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
D Enter, participate in, and complete the
program at
a Participate in and complete any a educational; and/or D vocational training n as directed by the
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or D with
D Participate in and complete any
training D as directed by the Department of Adult
Probation and Parole; or a with
a Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs.
-BL Submit to drug testing.
qMMot associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distributes narcotics or drugs.
D Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally,
q Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances.
& Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
•^s Submit to testing for alcohol use.
D Take antabuse a as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
Obtain and maintain full-time employment.
Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling.
>Q Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with
\J{chrvu3
.
a Defendant's probation may be transferred to
under the Interstate Compact as approved
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
• Complete
hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation
and Parole.
.hours of community service restitution in lieu of.
.days in jail.
Complete
;Q^ Defendant is to commit no crimes.
for a review of this sentence.
a Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on

X2.

f

'Art •

•

m

a

___

D
t } o
DATED t h i s ^ ^ d a y nf
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- . .MP UC-fID AT DIRECTION OF JUDGE
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HE STATE OF UTAH
JUDGEMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)
Plaintiff,
Case No.
•h-t\i.~

~^-\-'I\-A,\
73

I
V

CO i

Count No
Honorable

Clerk

c

\ i 1 C A S"

3
) ^' L^JL- i ^

\Vl\S

Reporter
Bailiff
Date_

Defendant.

The motion of
to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
pose sentence accordingly in • granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
ould not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by • a jury; • the court^/Stf plea of guilty;
plea of no contest; of the offense of
A a Q\
, a felony
t VJ^-J /.u.u_ t
the O
degree, • a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
)resented by fLoUc± L\\ \^t>\^ad
the State being represented by £ V^L \C^>is now adjudged guilty
the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
3
to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be life;
2 / not to exceed five years;
3^ of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
C^^^y
2
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
D
not to exceed
years;
D
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
;
n
tL and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $
tr>.
flw
2
2

such sentence is to run concurrently with
( X \ \ ClA^CVvS
such sentence is to run consecutively with
upon motion of • State, • Defense, • Court(s)

y

*

.

are hereby dismissed.

D.
&-'

Defendant is granted a stay of above (^kprison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the
* period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
Y
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County • for delivery to the
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, or £>4or delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shaJ^be
confined and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
J;
Commitment shall issue
^
DATED this r j f f l day of C - f f i l ^

, t^CD\

PROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel

-\>.Deputy
\V>\&\^
County Attorney
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT) TO
SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL

Plaintiff,
vs.

(J\Cw\tt>

Case No. .
Count No.
Honorable
Clerk
Reporter
Bailiff

b^'tVW,
%

Defendant.

Date

CI ll-lCJ'XL

qoga&Kfrr

M-??0-Cl

. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
D The motion of.
impose sentence accordingly is • granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; • the court Jgfplea of guilty; • plea
of no contest; of the offense of
<n'm|?|< &A^C\Ak[t
.
a class o 2 _ misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and represented by
£w<t<
fllfy/X/S^
and the State being represented by T X > X \ l v \ o <\r\
, is
now adjudged guilty of the above offense,
ntenced to a term in the Salt Lake County Jail,
months;
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $.
"E**and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $.

frfoPto d**^*^

teL

^^such sentence is to run concurrently with . OA\ f.CA;{Vg:
h such sentence is to run consecutively with
D upon motion of D State, D Defense. D Court, Count(s)
_.

are hereby dismissed.

D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D jail) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of this
Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Probation and
Parole for the period of
pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
* £ Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, to be confined and
/
imprisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail in accordance with this Judgment and Comm
p< Commitment shall issue
><r
DATED this
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

day of

3o

foOVWgY
Defense Counsel

D . frV>\cw>
Deputy County Attorney
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IE STATE OF UTAH
JUDGEMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)
(

Plaintiff,

00 i 1 \aoz±~

Case No
Count No
H o n o r a h l f l ~ / ^ C&~4

Clerk

l/J?3/S/

^jj£

Reporter.
Bailiff

Defendant.

Date

ft»-Sfi**g\

^\^C

Cy\

. to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
The motion of.
>ose sentence accordingly in • granted Q denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
>uld not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by • a jury; • the court, S^ plea of guilty;
plea of no contest; of the offense of
^ ^
QiM c \J(r^A^i „
t a felony
he jAiMdegree, • a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
resented by n-iuu
D l i ^ ^ ^ r a n d the State being represented by"h Uo\CM> , is now adjudged guilty
ne above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:

'r
/

to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be life;
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
and ordered to pay restitution
v in the amount of $

CSS

.

S

t

/

..-ffivP-to Htekcrtv^

fcSftNVjWrs WC\ aft \a

such sentence is to run concurrently with Q l \ L X C O O C W ^ — > ^\
such sentence is to run consecutively with.
• State,
• Defense, U
• Court(s]
Court(s
upon motion of u
state, U

are hereby dismissed.

rw—<«_* is
*^ a~ stay
~*«t. of
~t above
« u — / ^ a ^orison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of
: granted
Defendant
this Court and under the supervision f the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the
pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
period of.
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake Counttyfil^pr delivery to the
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, o^St^for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where c^fldsnt sffett^be
confined and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. / X : .
••'"•
Commitment shall issue
<7-f}
J^rO^
\
DATED this.

. day of

IOVED AS TO FORM:
DISTRICT O
Defense Counsel

> v\cton
Deputy County Attorney
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Third District Court, State of Utah
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

S+aft
Plaintiff

COMMITMENT

VS

After Judgment

(JkrxsJjbO

t ) ' V//AJE-VI .

en* NO. JL°131M<* r

Address

DOB

'A*ys/

Defendant

THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH:
On the.

36

day of

r-^>"

A*K

^

,the above

named defendant was brought before a judge
District i*uuri,
Court, oSalt
Lake County,
l u g e of
ui the
i n c UI&IXIV;I
a i i UCIKC
t^uuuiy, oState
i a i c of
ui Utah,
uian,
charged with having committed the crime

-h

t

neH>f $
The defendant was found guilty and was sentenced to pay a finexrf
. days in the County Jail with
the fine on or before

^^^

*—^

and to serve

days in jail to be suspended upon payment of
;

The fine has not been paid, nor secured, nor has an appeal been taken;
You are hereby commanded to take said defendant into custody and safely keep until he/she shall serve
out the above-named term of imprisonment or shall pay $
for each

Dated

W
£<

—-*

not to exceed one day

of the fine.

-Bj^J

.. ^M. I

3-6

may b* -^^^4

&

ec^.
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Addendum C

Addendum C

DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
C. DANE NOLAN 4891
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

BRIEF ON RESTITUTION ISSUES

Plaintiff,
vs.
CHARLES LEE DIVINEY,
Defendant.

CASE NO. 001912025
JUDGE SHEILA K. McCLEVE

The State of Utah, by and through its counsel, C. Dane Nolan, Salt Lake County
Deputy District Attorney, hereby respectfully submits the following Brief on Restitution
Issues in the above captioned matter:
1. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 76-3-201 (1953 as amended) the Court, in a
criminal case, is required to order that the defendant make restitution to the victims of his
crime. A victim is any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. The legislature, in subsection
8, stated that the Court should consider all relevant facts including the cost of the damage

or loss to property, the cost of necessary medical and related professional services,
devices relating to physical, psychiatric, psychological care, including non-medical care
and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of
the place of treatment; the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and
rehabilitation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense
resulted in bodily injury to the victim.
2. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 77-18-1 (1953 as amended) the Court, can,
as a condition of probation, require the defendant to make restitution to the victims, with
interest.
3. The defendant in this case was sentenced on April 30, 2001 - at that time the
Court ordered that he pay restitution to the victims as a condition of being placed on
probation. Subsequently the Court has conducted hearings and taken evidence on the
issue as to what the amount of restitution is.
4. The State submits that the following amounts should appropriately be ordered
as restitution:
-$554 to Crime Victims Reparations for medical expenses such as copayments and prescriptions that were not covered by Debra Diviney's health insurer,
IHC.
-$2121.37 to Crime Victims Reparations for payments made to Debra
Diviney for lost wages. This has been calculated as follows. The testimony during the
hearings was that Crime Victims Reparations paid Debra Diviney $2362.41 for lost
wages. That amount included 5 days that were not related to either of the two incidents

that led to the defendant being charged and convicted. The rate of pay was $12.48 per
hour. The number of hours was 5.8 per day. Only 66% of the product was paid to Debra
Diviney to take into account that had she worked and earned pay for those days she
would have had to pay taxes at a rate of approximately 34%. $12.48 x 5.8 hours x 5 days
x 66% = $241.04. $2362.41 minus $241.04 = $2121.37.
--$8.00 to Crime Victims Reparations for payments made to Debra
Diviney for travel expenses.
--$916 to Crime Victims Reparations for payments made to Debra Diviney
for the expense of installing an alarm system and the expense of quarterly fees associated
with two alarm systems. The testimony during the hearings was that Debra Diviney had
an alarm system installed prior to the incidents that led to the defendant being charged
and convicted and then had a second alarm system installed afterwards. The total amount
of the installation costs and quarterly fees for the two systems was $1447. The cost of
installation and non-qualifying fees of the first system was $531 ($449 plus $82). $1447 $531 =$916.
-$299.05 to Crime Victims Reparations for payments made to Chuck
Diviney III for lost wages. This individual testified that he suffered bodily injury as a
result of being attacked by his father.
5. The State requests that the defendant pay interest on the above amounts from
the date of sentencing, April 30, 2001.
6. The State also gives notice that it intends to seek full restitution for all
anticipated future payments made by Crime Victims Reparations, including costs

associated with Debra Diviney's anticipated wrist and hand surgery, and payments made
to Chuck Diviney III for lost wages in 2001.
7. The State also gives notice that it intends to seek full restitution for all
anticipated future payments made by Debra Diviney's health insurer, IHC, for costs and
expenses associated with her anticipated wrist and hand surgery.
Dated this 27th day of December, 2001.

*e Nolan
District Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that the above and foregoing was delivered to Bruce Oliver, 180
South 300 West #210, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, on the 27th day of December, 2001,
through the United States Postal Service.
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DAVE) E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
C.DANE NOLAN 4891
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER OF RESTITUTION

Plaintiff,
vs.
CHARLES LEE DIVINEY,
Defendant.

CASE NO. 001912025
JUDGE SHEILA K. McCLEVE

The above captioned matter having come before the Court on the 4' day of
February, 2002, relating to the issue of restitution, the State of Utah being represented by
its counsel, C. Dane Nolan, Salt Lake County Deputy District Attorney, the defendant
having been present and represented by his counsel, Bruce Oliver, the Court having
previously taken testimony, the Court having entertained oral argument, and the Court
now being fully advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

1. That the defendant is to pay, as restitution, the following amounts;
-$554.00 to the office of Crime Victim's Reparations for medical expenses
such as co-payments and prescriptions that were not covered by Debra
Diviney's health insurer,
-$2121.37 to Crime Victims Reparations for payments made to Debra
Diviney for lost wages,
-$8.00 to Crime Victims Reparations for payments made to Debra Diviney
for travel expenses,
-$916 to Crime Victims Reparations for payments made to Debra Diviney for
the expense of installing an alarm system and the expense of quarterly fees
associated with two alarm systems, and
-499.05 to Crime Victims Reparations for payments made to Chuck Diviney
III for lost wages.
2. The defendant is ordered to pay interest on the above amounts from the date of
sentencing, April 30, 2001.
Dated this

^<r day of

SH
Third District J

i«\

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that the above and foregoing was delivered to Bruce Oliver, 180
South 300 West #210, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, on thfe^^W day of February, 2002,
through the United States Postal Service.

Addendum E

Addendum E

DATES OFF WORK*

REASONS FOR ABSENCE*

June 15-21, 2000
June 30, 2000
July 31, 2000
August 31, 2000
September 7, 2000
September 29, 2000
October 20, 2000
October 25, 2000
October 27, 2000
November 30, 2000
December 4, 2000
December 5, 2000
December 12-13,2000

injuries to hand
pain/swelling in hand; charge--off
pain/swelling in hand; charge--off
pain/swelling in hand; charge--off
court hearing
pain/swelling in hand; charge -off
in court
in court
in court
visit to doctor; charge-off
hand surgery
recovery from surgery
in court

NO. OF WORKING DAYS

SUBTOTAL
anuary29, 2001
anuary30, 2001
xbruary 2, 2001
r
ebruary20, 2001
ebruary28, 2001
4arch2,2001
larch 16,2001
larch 26, 2001
larch 30, 2001
.pril 30, 2001
lay 31, 2001
me 4, 2001
ine 18-28,2001
me 29, 2001
ily 18,2001

in court
in court;
pain in hand
pain in hand
pain in hand; charge-off
in court
pain in hand
pain in hand
pain in hand; charge-off
pain in hand; charge-off
pain in hand; charge-off
in court
recovery from surgery
recovery from surgery; charge-off
recovery from surgery
SUBTOTAL
TOTAL

5 days
1 day
1 day
1 day
1 day
1 day
1 day
1 day
1 day
1 day
1 day
1 day
2 days
18 days
1 day
1 day
1 day
1 day
1 day
1 day
1 day
1 day
1 day
1 day
1 day
1 day
9 days
1 day
1 day
23 days
41 DAYS

\\\ of these dates and the reasons provided for each are based on the testimony of
iristine Ackmann when she summarized the dates for which CVR compensated
iborah (R. 292: 10-13). Counsel for the State has added the "charge-off' notations for
>se dates provided by Ackmann's testimony which fall on the last working day of the
mth. A similar listing appears in defendant's opening brief. Br. of Aplt. at 18-20.

